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This paper extends a previous study in South Africa aimed at developing methodology 
for assessing the performance of equity-share schemes. The previous study proposed 
four broad criteria to measure performance: poverty alleviation; empowerment and 
participation; institutional arrangements and governance; and financial performance. 
This paper does not aim to assess the performance of existing equity-share schemes but 
to develop a methodology for the first three criteria based on empirical analysis of data 
gathered in 2004 from a land reform project in the Midlands of KwaZulu-Natal and 
seven established equity-share schemes in the Western Cape. Poverty alleviation is 
measured using a transition matrix of households grouped by four different symptoms 
of poverty: current income, wealth, health and a principal component index of housing 
quality. Eight categories of indicators are recommended for empowerment and 
participation: control and ownership; skills transfer; understanding; information; 
outcomes; trust; outreach; and participation. A scorecard applying norms based on 
empirical evidence gathered at the equity-share schemes in the Western Cape is used to 
test the indicators. A scorecard approach is also applied to institutional arrangements 
and governance, which are measured using three categories of indicators: 
accountability, transparency and property rights. The proposed performance measures 
are relevant, manageable in number and have feasible norms based on empirical 
evidence. These indicators and their norms need to be tested on a wider scale and 
monitored over time. Future research should be undertaken to determine weights for 




Equity-share schemes were initiated by the private sector in South Africa (SA) 
during the early 1990’s and have been implemented in a variety of agricultural 
and eco-tourism enterprises to promote agrarian reform and black economic 
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empowerment (BEE) (Knight & Lyne, 2002). These schemes should be 
regarded as an instrument of agrarian reform because they transfer rights to 
benefit from land and a host of complementary assets such as expertise, 
machinery, liquidity and established markets needed to make efficient use of 
land. They offer BEE benefits, including poverty alleviation and the 
redistribution of wealth and income streams to poor people (Knight et al, 2003; 
Eckert et al, 1996). 
 
Several studies have been carried out on equity-share schemes in South Africa, 
but to date no single study has measured the success of equity-share schemes 
in terms of a comprehensive set of criteria. Karaan (2003) also notes that 
effective monitoring systems are lacking and this may ultimately lead to 
opportunism. The most common concerns raised by earlier studies related to 
worker understanding of the scheme, worker participation during 
establishment, beneficiaries’ expectations, power relations, skills transfer, 
labour relations, gender issues and tenure security (Mayson, 2003; Karaan, 
2003; Hall et al, 2001; Fast, 1999; Eckert et al, 1996). A more detailed discussion 
of these issues may be found in Gray et al (2004). Knight and Lyne (2002) 
studied eight equity-share schemes in the Western Cape and showed that 
many of these concerns had been corrected in the more successful projects. 
Worker-shareholders at these schemes had purchased net farm assets worth 
R7 million (in constant 2001 prices) representing 3.5-50 per cent of the total 
shareholding. They showed that workers did not cite power relations as a 
problem and that women made up over 50 per cent of shareholders at 63 per 
cent of the projects.  
 
Based on policy and socio-economic issues raised in previous studies of 
equity-share schemes, Gray et al (2004) proposed four criteria for objectively 
monitoring the performance of equity-share schemes but focused their study 
only on financial criteria. By contrast, this paper focuses on Gray et al’s. (2004) 
other three performance criteria, namely: poverty alleviation; empowerment 
and participation; and institutional arrangements and governance. The aim is 
not to assess the performance of existing equity-share schemes in South 
African agriculture but to propose a feasible set of measures to monitor non-
financial aspects of their performance. Section 2 reviews literature on the 
criteria appropriate to this study and defines the indicators proposed to 
measure them. Section 3 describes the application of these measures to a land 
reform project in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Midlands and to seven existing 
equity-share schemes in the Western Cape province. The data are used to 
propose realistic norms for the empowerment and institutional indicators, and 
to construct scorecards against which equity-share schemes may be assessed. 




2. PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS  FOR EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES 
 
2.1 Poverty  alleviation 
 
Poverty has been defined as the “denial of opportunities and choices most 
basic to human development to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy 
a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and respect from 
others” (Hirschowitz et al, 2000:54). Symptoms of poverty include low levels of 
income (Woolard, 2002) and economic wealth (Little, 2002), low levels of 
health (Southcentre.org, 2003; UNFPA, 2002) and poor standards of housing 
(May et al cited by Shinns & Lyne, 2004). Equity-share schemes may help to 
reduce poverty amongst poor beneficiaries like farmworkers and their families 
as they offer supplemental income in the form of dividend payouts and capital 
gains realised, empowerment through skills transfer and the ability to 
influence working conditions. In order to assess the extent to which equity-
share schemes enable participants to move out of poverty, it is first necessary 
to consider the problem of measuring poverty.  
 
2.1.1 Poverty  lines 
 
Poverty lines are commonly used to assess poverty at the household level. 
Money metric poverty lines are usually determined by some level of 
consumption, expenditure or income that is adequate enough to meet primary 
human needs (Woolard & Leibbrandt, 1999; Greeley, 1994). The most 
commonly used determinant of poverty lines is income. Alternatives to using 
income as the basis for poverty lines include household consumption, per 
capita food expenditure, budget share of food expenditure (food ratio), 
average educational level of adult household members, quality of housing, 
access to clean water and sanitation, employment and wealth (Zeller et al, 
2003; Woolard, 2002; Hirschowitz et al, 2000; Woolard & Leibbrandt, 1999). The 
point at which a poverty line is drawn is somewhat subjective and often 
controversial (Barrett, 2003; Woolard & Leibbrandt, 1999). Nevertheless, single 
dimensional poverty lines are widely used to assess welfare despite their 
imprecision (Greeley, 1994).  
 
Multi-faceted indexes of poverty also classify households on the basis of 
poverty lines. Two poverty indexes have been developed by Statistics South 
Africa (SSA), namely, the household infrastructure index (HII) and the 
household circumstances index (HCI) (Hirschowitz et al, 2000). Principal 
component (PC) loadings indicate which variables define the two indexes. 
Variables with high loadings in the HII include: living in formal housing, 




telephone or cellular telephone, refuse removal at least once a week, level of 
education of the household head and monthly household expenditure. The 
HCI is defined by: household unemployment rate, average household size and 
children under the age of five years (Hirschowitz et al, 2000). SSA applies cut-
off points on these indexes to separate their sample into ‘developmental 
groups’. However, these cut-off points are arbitrary as they have no theoretical 
or empirical basis.  
 
Carter and May (2001) present a dynamic approach to measuring poverty 
based on underlying household assets. Time gives people the opportunity to 
escape from poverty, but also increases the possibility of experiencing 
negative shocks that decrease income or assets. If household i at time t has a 
vector of assets Ait, then at every period the household chooses consumption 
(cit) and investment (Iit) in order to maximise a discounted stream of expected 
well-being. Carter and May (2001) begin with the standard money metric 
poverty line c and consider a person poor if cit≤c. Households that are poor 
due to cit≤c at each point in time are termed chronically poor, while 
h o u s e h o l d s  t h a t  m o v e  b e tween poor and non-poor are termed transitorily 
poor. The structure or asset base of poverty is explored in terms of a poverty 
line which is interpreted as a cut-off point between households that fall above 
or below a certain asset base. 
 
Carter and May (2001) then introduce a dynamic poverty line J, where J is the 
present value of sequences of poverty lines. Households can then be 
reclassified as falling above or below the discounted poverty line to indicate 
which households are in a poverty trap. A household is considered 
dynamically poor if J*(A0i)<J. This means that the long-term expected stream 
of well-being is less than the certain equivalence value of a stream of single-
period poverty living standards (Carter & May, 2001). By expressing the 
poverty line in terms of income predicted from observed asset holdings, this 
approach has more in common with Zeller et al’s (2003) view that poverty is 
multi-dimensional and has both qualitative and quantitative indicator 
variables. Expected income is regressed on the asset base of households to 
obtain an estimate of their permanent income. If there is a good fit, the 
predicted income is used to classify households above or below an income 
poverty line. Data on durable assets, such as livestock and vehicles, drawn 
from panel surveys are used to predict real income per adult equivalent for 
each household in each year. Absolute poverty is then assessed by comparing 
these predicted incomes with a poverty line. This method does not take into 
account that the poverty line chosen has an effect on the classification of 
households and therefore the resulting poverty profile may be over- or 




2.1.2  Measures of poverty not based on poverty lines 
 
Shinns and Lyne (2004) studied the poverty status of land reform beneficiaries 
at Clipstone farm in the KZN Midlands. Symptoms of poverty were analysed 
using principal components analysis (PCA) and hierarchical cluster analysis 
(HCA). Poverty symptoms were measured in terms of housing quality, 
income, health and wealth. PCA was used to create an index of housing 
quality based on material of the exterior walls, access to safe drinking water 
and adequate sanitation. This index is similar to the HII discussed in section 
2.1.1. Shinns and Lyne (2004) estimated the housing index as follows: 
 
PC1  =  housing quality = 0.65(walls) + 0.81(water) + 0.54(sanitation). 
Where: 
PC1  =  the first principal component index of housing quality, 
Walls  =  standardised value of a dummy variable scoring one for brick 
or stone walls, and zero otherwise, 
Water  = standardised value of a dummy variable scoring one for 
protected water source, and zero otherwise, and 
Sanitation = standardised value of a dummy variable scoring one for 
adequate, and zero otherwise, where adequate includes 
ventilated pit latrines and waterborne sewerage. 
 
The study households were then subject to HCA using the housing index and 
measures of household income, assets and health as grouping variables. Most 
households were found to be relatively income ‘rich’ and asset poor (29 per 
cent) or income poor and asset ‘rich’ (29 per cent). A significant number (24 
per cent) were classified as both income and asset poor, and some (18 per cent) 
as relatively income and asset ‘rich’. Changes in the distribution of poverty 
o v e r  t i m e  c a n  b e  s t u d i e d  b y  c o n s t r u c t i ng a ‘transition matrix’ to track the 
movement of individual households between poverty groups. In essence, the 
transition matrix shows whether certain groups have grown or shrunk, 
indicating positive or negative changes in poverty status. In this study, the 
transition matrix is applied to the multi-dimensional approach used by Shinns 
and Lyne (2004). 
 
2.2  Empowerment and participation 
 
Empowerment is a process that enables participation. Narayan (2002:11) 




people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold 
accountable institutions that affect their lives”. Whereas Narayan (2002) and 
others (Bartle, 2003; Reid, 1999) treat empowerment and participation as 
synonymous concepts where empowerment requires active involvement by 
the community, this study takes the view that empowerment and participation 
are two distinct concepts, where empowerment is an enabling process and 
participation focuses on the meaningfulness of participation itself. 
Empowerment may only impart the right to participate in, and benefit from, 
an activity. Bartle (2003) lists 16 elements of empowerment, while the World 
Bank (Narayan, 2002:14) defines four. These elements have been grouped into 
four main indicators: empowerment, outreach, trust and participation. 
Together they provide disadvantaged people with the rights, means, skills and 
incentives needed to participate in decision-making processes.  
 
Until recently, measures of participation focused on who, how many, how 
often and the ways in which people participated, but it ignored the quality of 
participation. Assessing the quality of participation is important because 
participation has both developmental benefits, such as promoting new 
attitudes and skills, and instrumental benefits that influence the outcome of 
participation schemes (Morrissey, 2000). A discussion of the indicators follows. 
 
2.2.1  Empowerment, outreach and trust 
 
2.2.1.1   Information, skills transfer, understanding, and control and ownership 
 
Empowerment requires access to information, and the transfer of skills, 
control and ownership. Establishing an equity-share scheme with previously 
disadvantaged workers requires more than just passive access to information – 
it requires facilitation. Facilitation refers to the process of actively providing 
prospective shareholders with information, gaining consensus on institutional 
arrangements and creating suitable legal entities to represent worker interests. 
The quality of the facilitation process is therefore indicated by the 
shareholders’ knowledge and understanding of the scheme in terms of their 
rights and obligations. A South African case study in 1996 showed that very 
few workers understood the role of the workers’ Trust and the management of 
their funds (Eckert et al, 1996), while case studies from 2001 showed otherwise 
(Knight & Lyne, 2002). The workers’ Trust acts as a ‘warehouse’ for the 
workers’ shares and becomes the shareholder in the operating entity. Some of 
the Trustees then represent the workers’ interests in the operating entity. 
General meetings are the main forum for sharing information with 
shareholders. Worker-shareholders will not be empowered to participate if 




participate, their relative shareholding prevents them from influencing Board 
decisions, and if records (e.g. minutes) are not circulated amongst members. 
Low meeting frequency and attendance suggests that workers will become 
less informed of the operations of the business and unable to raise questions 
and issues that would aid their participation and understanding. 
 
All prospective worker-shareholders should participate in the process of 
designing the institutions that will represent their interests in the enterprise 
and define their rights and obligations. Formal organisations are more likely to 
give members greater influence over decision-making than informal 
institutions (Narayan, 2002:18). Knight and Lyne’s (2002) Western Cape case 
studies showed that extensive workshopping had occurred with prospective 
beneficiaries on the more successful schemes to select a suitable legal entity 
and to establish its constitutional and operating rules. Legal entities used to 
represent the interests of worker-shareholders range from communal property 
associations (CPA’s) to participatory unit Trusts. Whatever legal entity is 
chosen, the constitutional arrangements should alleviate the free-rider, 
horizon, portfolio, control and influence problems commonly associated with 
conventional producer co-operatives (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000:335). Knight et 
al (2003) recommended that these problems are best alleviated if the legal 
entity is structured as, or like, a company with tradable benefit and voting 
rights proportional to individual investment.  
 
Skills transfer should be a priority for all equity-share schemes, otherwise 
workers and their representatives cannot participate meaningfully in decision-
making (Knight & Lyne, 2002). The Trustees must administer the Trust and 
their Board representatives must contribute to policy-making for the farming 
enterprise. Monitoring is facilitated by tradable shares. Workers, like 
shareholders in any company, will vote their representatives out if share prices 
fall. Advanced training is best targeted at the representatives, not ordinary 
shareholders. While the Surplus People’s Project (SPP) (Fast, 1999) reported in 
1998 that workers did not acquire new skills or benefit from capacity building, 
Knight and Lyne’s (2002) study in the Western Cape found that more 
successful schemes provided general training in literacy and life skills for 
ordinary worker-shareholders, and that Trustees received higher level training 
in finance, management and administration. Karaan (2003) criticised worker 
participation in planning and decision-making at equity-share schemes. To 
promote participation during the planning phase, initial training should be 
designed to improve basic life skills of all prospective worker-shareholders. To 
promote participation in decision-making, training should focus on Trustees 
and higher-level skills. This training must be ongoing as new Trustees are 




Training Authority’ (SETA) certified must comply with certain conditions set 
out by the Skills Development Act, Act 97 of 1998. The purpose of this Act is to 
develop skills in the workforce, encourage worker participation in training 
programmes and to promote quality of education and training. Janssens et al 
(2004) conducted a study on beneficiary perceptions of BEE in South African 
agriculture. They elicited scores on five training variables using a five-point 
Likert-type scale. The mean scores for their five indicators ranged from 2.99 to 
3.92. They concluded that beneficiaries were “neutral” about skills transfer 
because the mean score for their training variable was close to a value of three, 
their assumed norm for all five indicators. Although this study proposes 
similar indicators to Janssens et al (2004), empirical evidence is used to gauge 
appropriate norms specific to each indicator. 
 
Even if training programmes are SETA certified, adequate and understood by 
worker-shareholders, empowerment may be constrained by a small relative 
shareholding. Norms for meaningful aggregate worker-shareholding have not 
yet been developed for equity-share schemes. Fast (1999) recommended that 
worker-shareholding should be at least 50 per cent to ensure that the balance 
of power lies with the workers. While his report does note the problem of 
financing such a large share of a firm’s equity, it does not recognise that the 
creditworthiness of a scheme would be seriously undermined if the majority 
shareholding transferred to people that have no track record of successful 
business management. This emphasises the need for equity-share schemes to 
transfer management skills and so maintain their creditworthiness as and 
when majority ownership passes to the workers. A stronger case could be 
made for workers to collectively hold at least 25 per cent of the equity in a 
scheme. At this level, the South African Companies Act, Act 61 of 1973, confers 
certain rights on minority shareholders, including the right to representation 
at Board level.  
 
Karaan (2003) reported problems with control and ownership issues in equity-
share schemes where ownership is diversified but control remains in the 
hands of specialised managers who exert considerable power and influence, 
and are often not workers. Based on this argument measures of control and 
ownership should be separated. Ownership is best measured by relative 
worker-shareholding and control by worker representation on the Board. 
Control (voting rights) must be proportional to individual investment to 
alleviate free- and forced-rider problems. Control is also measured by 
information and skills transfer, which aim to increase the decision-making 
capabilities of worker-shareholders. A more subjective measure of control is 
how the workers rate their ability to influence policy on matters such as 




Poor people seldom have sufficient savings or credit to finance the purchase of 
equity. Without grants, participation in equity-share schemes would be 
confined to relatively more wealthy workers. Small grants curtail the relative 
shareholding of workers, decreasing their ability to influence policy on matters 
such as working conditions. Improved working conditions alleviate poverty 
through better housing, healthcare, insurance and leave benefits. Housing is 
one of the most important benefits cited by worker-shareholders, followed by 
schooling and clinics (Knight & Lyne, 2002). Beneficiaries studied by the SPP 
were disappointed with the lack of tangible benefits and claimed that there 
had been little improvement in working conditions and land tenure security. 
Knight and Lyne (2002), however, found that worker-shareholders on more 
successful schemes perceived that they could improve working conditions if 
they chose to. In these case studies, workers reported that their influence over 
decision-making was proportional - or more than proportional - to their 
shareholding and that communication c h a n n e l s  w e r e  k e p t  o p e n  t h r o u g h  
regular meetings of shareholders. Worker equity ranged from 3.5-50.0 per cent 
at these schemes. This contrasts with Karaan’s (2003) view that even if the 




Measures of empowerment reflecting the combined effects of skills transfer, 
r e l a t i v e  s h a r e h o l d i n g  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  information may best be found in the 
outcomes of these schemes. If empowerment is successful then positive 
outcomes of equity-share schemes should include improved working 
conditions and tenure security, trust amongst worker-shareholders in the 
scheme and improved labour relations. Half of the worker representatives 
interviewed in Knight and Lyne’s (2002) Western Cape study did not cite 
tenure security as the most important benefit expected from equity-share 
schemes. Karaan (2003) criticised the tenure security aspect of equity-share 
schemes claiming that several schemes have focused on acquiring land for 
worker-shareholders with little emphasis placed on individual tenure security. 
Tenure security should rather be examined in the context of what happens to a 
family’s continued access to housing or land when a worker dies or leaves the 
scheme. If continued access is conditional upon employment then the ability of 
equity-share schemes to improve tenure security is questionable. Gray et al 
(2004) reported that positive outcomes of the equity-share schemes they 
studied, as perceived by the workers, were improved tenure security, the 
ability to influence wages and working conditions, secure employment, 
improved sanitation, access to telephones and access to safe drinking water. In 
this study, tenure security is measured by property ownership, ownership of 




worker-shareholders receive land title or long-term leases. Where residential 
rights are conditional upon employment the ability of equity-share schemes to 
improve tenure security is compromised.  
 
Positive outcomes of equity-share schemes also include income and wealth 
redistribution (Knight et al, 2003). Changes in worker income are measured by 
creating dummy variables for income from dividends, capital gains, interest 
received and changes in the aggregate wage bill, where one indicated positive 
changes and zero negative changes. Housing quality is based on the approach 
of Shinns and Lyne (2004) in their study of symptoms of poverty at Clipstone 
farm. They measured housing quality in terms of material of the exterior walls, 
adequate sanitation and access to safe drinking water. In the case of the study 
schemes data were obtained on whether the benefits of equity-sharing 
included improved housing, improved sanitation and access to safe drinking 
water.  
 
Access to basic services is measured by access to electricity, health services, 
schools, telephones and improved roads. These are scored as dummy 
variables, where one indicates the presence of an attribute and zero otherwise. 
Lastly, working conditions are measured by the ability of workers to influence 
wages and working conditions; security of employment; medical contributions 
made by the employer as either a contribution to medical bills or a medical aid 
scheme; and pension benefits. Benefits included in the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, Act 75 of 1997, such as leave and unemployment rights, 




Equity-share schemes are a means of transferring income, in the form of wages 
and dividends, and wealth through ownership of marketable shares to 
previously disadvantaged people. Outreach performance depends on the 
ability of the scheme to increase the incomes and wealth of the poorest people. 
Equity shareholding by women, unskilled workers and unemployed people is 
therefore relevant in determining the outreach of these schemes.  
 
According to Mayson (2003), men participate disproportionately more than 
women in equity-share schemes because participation is linked to 
employment. Women generally did not participate as equals in the schemes 
studied by the SPP. Knight and Lyne’s (2002) Western Cape study was more 
positive about female participation, but found that women are discriminated 
against in terms of wages. This is to be expected for unskilled workers because 




they cannot undertake manual labour of equal value. Skills transfer to women, 
in particular, may help to bridge the gender divide between salaries. Knight 
and Lyne (2002) found that the majority of workers’ Trust deeds in their 
sample made special provision for the inclusion of women as Trustees. Female 
shareholders made up at least 75 per cent of shareholders at the Whitehall 
scheme studied by Eckert et al (1996) and between 33 per cent and 59 per cent 
at the schemes studied by Knight and Lyne (2002). With the introduction of 
the LRAD programme, women can access grant finance as individuals rather 
than as members of households (Mayson, 2003; Ministry for Agriculture & 
Land Affairs, 2000:3) improving their chances of purchasing equity. Objective 
measures of gender empowerment include provision for women as Trustees, 




An atmosphere of trust and reliability is required for a successful equity-share 
scheme (Knight & Lyne, 2002). Trust in the potential of the equity-share 
scheme to perform well is a prerequisite for shareholders to reinvest in the 
business and grow their equity. Putnam (cited by Karaan, 2003) notes that 
trust is a key indication of the development of social capital within an 
organisation and plays a role in limiting opportunism and resolving the 
problems of collective actio n .  L o w  w o r k e r  c o n f i d e n c e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  l e a d  t o  
increased wage demands and strikes, decreased productivity and decreased 
reinvestment in the business.  
 
Knight and Lyne (2002)  showed that some workers were willing to forego 
current earnings in order to reinvest, thereby showing an understanding of the 
project and confidence in management. Improved labour relations also foster 
trust. Labour relations improved in the majority of equity-share schemes 
studied by Knight and Lyne (2002) due to attitude changes, worker 
empowerment and incentives for financial performance. Long-serving 
workers are more likely to be better judges of trust given their experiences of 
past and present management. Eckert et al (1996) measured labour relations 
according to changes in labour productivity (labour/output ratio), labour 
turnover and rates of absenteeism.  
 
2.2.2 Participation  rate 
 
Ndibi and Kay (1999) developed a measure for the participation rate of a 
community. If the process of establishing and managing an equity-share 
scheme comprises activities a1, a2 … an, w1, w2 … wn are weights indicating the 




community and 1-βi denotes the involvement of other parties, then the 
participation rate for any one activity may be represented as follows (Ndibi & 
Kay, 1999): 
 
Pi(%) = βi(wi/∑wi) 
and the overall participation rate is the sum of the different participation rates 
for each activity: 
Pi(%) = ∑βi wi/∑wi 
 
Ndibi and Kay (1999) assigned activities to five participation groups, where 
the fifth group represented the least community participation (β5 = 0 per cent) 
and the greatest involvement by other parties (e.g. original owners), and the 
first group represented the highest possible community participation (β1 = 100 
per cent). For the other groups, Ndibi and Kay (1999) assigned involvement 
levels of 25, 50 and 75 per cent, respectively. A problem may arise in assigning 
βi to certain activities. Respondents should be asked to rate their participation 
relative to some defined activity so that consistency in their responses is 
ensured. In addition, the weights are discrete and subjective, bringing into 
question the reliability of the measure. The wi denote the relative importance 
of each activity. To estimate these weights, respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of each activity on a Likert-type scale (1 = most important and 5 = 
least important). The estimated βi and subjective wi values were then used to 
compute the overall participation rate.  
 
2.3   Institutional arrangements and governance  
 
2.3.1 Best  institutional  arrangements for equity-share schemes 
 
Cook & Iliopoulos (2000:336) identified practices that preserve credit-
worthiness and which eliminate the problems of free- and forced-riding 
associated with conventional producer co-operatives. Knight et al (2003) found 
positive links between sound institutional arrangements, effective worker 
empowerment, competent management and the successful performance of an 
equity-share scheme. They recommend that voting and benefit rights be 
assigned in proportion to individual investment and traded at their audited 
net asset value to eliminate free- and forced-riding, although some temporary 
restrictions on the transferability of shares may be necessary to prevent 
sudden outflows of capital and managerial expertise. Financial accountability 
and transparency must be maintained, e.g. through annual external auditing 
of financial statements. The best way of achieving these arrangements is 




company. The South African Companies Act, Act 61 of 1973, also entrenches 
principles of good governance such as accountability and transparency 
(Knight et al, 2003). Finally, they maintain that good corporate governance is 
achieved through competent management, incentive schemes, a long-term 
business plan, procedures to resolve disputes and good labour relations.  
 
2.3.2  Principles of good governance 
 
King (2002) identified governance practices applicable to all business entities 
and described four ‘pillars’ of good governance: transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and fairness. These four categories incorporate the following: 
provision in the constitution for externally audited financial statements, 
disclosure and circulation of financial statements to shareholders, notice and 
conduct of meetings, disclosure and circulation of minutes, sound voting and 
election procedures, personal liability of negligent directors and penalties for 
bad management. Benefit and voting rights (i.e. property rights) should be 
proportional to individual investment by shareholders, and shares should be 
fully transferable to alleviate free- and forced-riding problems.  
 
Narayan (2002:2) reports on the linkages between empowerment and good 
governance and argues that good governance is unlikely if participants have 
not been empowered with the knowledge and skills needed to exercise their 
rights. Conversely, empowerment is not possible without the good 
governance practices of accountability, transparency and well defined 
property rights. 
 
3. APPLICATION  OF  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data  collection 
 
3.1.1 Poverty  alleviation 
 
Shinns and Lyne (2004) carried out a census survey of all 38 beneficiary 
households at Clipstone farm in the KZN Midlands during November 2002. 
The same 38 households were then paneled during August 2004. Respondents 
were asked questions about housing quality, household wealth, health and 
income. Wealth was measured in terms of livestock, the only significant non-
depreciating and liquid asset identified in the surveys. Clipstone is not an 
equity-share scheme but is used in this study to demonstrate the application of 
the transition matrix to measuring poverty because panel data were available 




assess the performance of the current CPA and conclusions regarding the 
performance of this land reform project should not be drawn from this paper.  
 
3.1.2 Empowerment, participation, institutional arrangements and governance 
 
A detailed study of seven established equity-share schemes was conducted in 
the Western Cape during February 2004 to test performance criteria proposed 
for empowerment and participation; institutional arrangements and 
governance; and financial performance. The latter are discussed by Gray et al 
(2004) and are therefore excluded from this paper. The activities at these farms 
included cut flowers and fruit (project 1), olives (project 2), fruit and wine 
grapes (project 3), wine grapes (projects 4 and 7), deciduous and citrus fruit 
(project 5), and vegetables and wine grapes (project 6). Interviews were held 
with the farm manager (frequently the previous farm owner), the chair of the 
workers’ Trust and ordinary worker-shareholders. The chair of the Trust and 
at least one other worker-shareholder were interviewed at each scheme, with 
four worker-shareholders interviewed at five of the seven schemes. Non-
shareholders were not interviewed. Both higher-level employees (such as 
office staff) and lower-level employees (such as crop sprayers) were 
interviewed and at least one female worker-shareholder was interviewed at 
each scheme. Responses to questions that required workers to rate indicators 
of empowerment or trust were not unanimous but varied within a relatively 
small range, usually between the highest point (5 = excellent or very high) and 
the middle point (3 = average) on a five-point Likert-type scale. In such cases, 
the mean response was recorded as representing the view of all worker-
shareholders employed on the farm. Three different questionnaires were used 
for these respondents. Worker-shareholders (including the chair of the 
workers’ Trust) were asked questions relating to skills transfer, benefits of the 
equity-sharing arrangement, trust and participation. The manager and chair of 
the Trust were asked questions on institutional arrangements and governance 
relating to the operating entity and workers’ Trust respectively. In addition, 
the manager was asked questions about meetings, communication with 
worker-shareholders, tenure security and gender equality. 
 
3.2 Results  and  discussion 
 
3.2.1 Poverty  alleviation 
 
3.2.1.1 Dynamic poverty approach 
 
Following Carter and May’s (2001) dynamic approach to measuring poverty, 




households at Clipstone. This regression yielded very low R2 values (less than 
0.05). Piecewise linear regression (Gujarati, 2003:317-319) was then used to test 
the hypothesis that only households with current income levels above some 
minimum threshold could afford to hold livestock. A threshold of R300/adult 
equivalent/month provided the best fit, with an R2 of just 0.055 for the 
piecewise regression of income on assets. Neither the value of livestock nor the 
level of adult education (human capital) was found to be statistically 
significant determinants of current income. As a result, Carter and May’s 
(2001) poverty line was abandoned in favour of Shinns and Lyne’s (2004) 
multi-dimensional measure of relative poverty. Accordingly, the transition 
matrix was used to detect shifts in group membership between the two 
surveys, where membership was based on current income, wealth, health and 
housing quality. 
 
Wealth was measured in terms of the estimated market value of livestock, and 
health as the number of household members sick enough to consult a doctor 
during the two months prior to the survey. A new PC index of housing quality 
was estimated from the pooled panel data. The index was estimated as 
follows: 
 
PC1 = housing quality = 0.78 (walls) + 0.82 (water) + 0.14 (sanitation) 
 
where the variables are as defined in section 2.1.2. The first PC was the only 
component with an Eigenvalue greater than one and explained 44 per cent of 
the total variation in the three housing variables. All of the poverty symptoms, 
apart from housing quality, were expressed in per capita adult equivalent (AE) 
terms, and all monetary values in 2001 Rands.  
 
3.2.1.2 Transition matrix  
 
Panel data gathered in the census surveys of beneficiary households at 
Clipstone in 2002 and 2004 were pooled and subject to non-hierarchical CA 
(Nie  et al, 1975). The data were pooled to ensure that the analysis would 
generate information about changes in relative poverty. Households were 
clustered into four poverty status groups: group 1 was intended for income 
and asset ‘rich’ households; group 2 for the income poor and asset ‘rich’; 
group 3 for the income ‘rich’ and asset poor; and group 4 for the income and 
asset poor households. Weights were applied to emphasise income and assets 
as more important clustering variables than health and housing quality.  
 
A transition matrix was constructed from the poverty groups after excluding 




The groups are ranked from the least poverty-stricken households (group 1) to 
the most poverty-stricken (group 4) according to the group means computed 
for each clustering variable (Table 2). The transition matrix shows the 
movement of individual households between poverty groups over the study 
period (2002-2004). The shaded cells in Table 1 show the number of 
households that did not change their position over the study period. Those 
below the diagonal track households whose poverty status improved, while 
those above the diagonal track households that moved into poorer groups.  
 
Table  1:  Transition matrix of 30 households at Clipstone farm for the study 
period 2002-2004 
2004 
Poverty groups  2002 
Poverty groups 
1 2 3 4  Total 
1  1 3 1  3  8 
2 2  2 0  2  6 
3 1  1  3 3  8 
4 0  1  2  5  8 
Total 4  7  6  13  30 
 
The transition matrix in Table 1 shows that 37 per cent of households did not 
shift between poverty groups over the study period. For some (23 per cent) 
welfare improved over time and for the remaining households (40 per cent) it 
worsened. The largest proportion of households fell into the income and asset 
poor group (group 4) in 2002 and 2004 (27 and 43 per cent respectively). 
Although the proportion of households in the poorest (least poor) group 
appears to have increased (decreased), it is first necessary to test for significant 
shifts and the direction of these shifts within groups. Following Carter and 
May (2001), Hout’s (1983:15) L2 statistic is used initially to test the hypothesis 
that a household’s poverty status in period two is independent of its position 




nfij ln (fij/Fij) 
where nfij represents the count in cell ij of the transition matrix, i the rows of 
the matrix, j the columns of the matrix, and Fij the frequency predicted for that 
cell under the assumption of perfect mobility. L2 is distributed χ2 with (r-1)2 
degrees of freedom, where r is the number of rows in the transition matrix, 
and is not statistically significant if a household’s poverty status in period two 
is independent of its starting position in period one. 




In this study L2 was not statistically significant and the null hypothesis of 
independence was accepted. In this case the Z-test for equality of proportions 
(Berenson et al, 2002) can be made for each group to identify significant shifts 
and the direction of these movements within groups over the time period. The 















21 ˆ P   =  the proportion of households in time period 2 in poverty group 1. 
p ˆ   =  an estimate of the standard error of  11 ˆ P - 21 ˆ P . 
n1 =  the sample size in time period 1. 
 
None of the Z-tests were statistically significant suggesting that the 
distribution of poverty did not change significantly over the study period. 
Table 2 highlights changes in absolute poverty over the study period. Only 
two of the t-tests applied to the group means in Table 2 showed significant 
differences between 2002 and 2004. In group 3 there were significant 
improvements in both health and housing quality over time. However, there 
were no significant changes in levels of income or wealth in any of the poverty 
groups, nor were there significant changes in health or housing quality in 
groups 1, 2 and 4. In short, there is no evidence of improvement in relative 
poverty, and very little evidence of improvement in absolute poverty, at 
Clipstone.  
 
Table 2:  Group means for poverty symptoms at Clipstone farm, 2002 and 2004 
(constant 2001 Rands) 
Income (per AE1) 
Rand/month 





index  Poverty group 
2002 2004 2002 2004 2002  2004  2002  2004 
1 332.64  324.05  4002.67  5277.56  0.1724 0.2043 1.6594  -0.3495 
2 102.07  113.79  4391.19  3872.04  0.1386 0.1446 0.3182  -0.2654 
3  332.42  308.12 1207.39 1383.23 0.0822 0.0000 -0.4336  -0.2654 
4  91.60  122.29 1152.49 1261.17 0.1681 0.1096 -0.0698  -0.2654 
Overall mean  213.81  180.49  2340.90  2357.23 0.1403 0.1086  0.2781  -0.2760 
Notes: 
1AE = (adults + (0.5) children)0.9--. 
2Number of adult members sick enough to visit a doctor. 




This application of the transition matrix has the advantage of using a multi-
dimensional measure of poverty, generates information about changes in both 
relative and absolute levels of poverty, and avoids the problem of comparing a 
single dimensional measure of poverty (such as an income poverty line) with a 
subjective and controversial cut-off point. 
 
3.2.2 Empowerment  and  participation 
 
A scorecard listing the proposed empowerment and participation indicators is 
presented in Table 3 and shows the scores computed for each study project. 
Eight categories of indicators are proposed in the scorecard: control and 
ownership; skills transfer; understanding; information; outcomes (benefits); 
trust; outreach; and participation. The indicators were scored as proportions or 
as dummy variables, where one indicates the presence of a characteristic 
important for good performance and zero the absence of the characteristic, or 
proportions. This empirical information was then used to gauge cut-off points 
or norms for certain indicators. Proportions that exceeded their norms for 
some of the indicators in the skills transfer, understanding, information and 
trust categories were then scored as one, and those below the norm as zero. 
Simple arithmetic means of proportions were computed for the other 
categories because their indicators are all continuous variables. 
 
An overall score was computed for each scheme. Missing values counted 
negatively in the scorecard as they were attributed to a lack of record keeping. 
In future studies, questions relating to attendance of meetings and 
absenteeism should be rephrased to distinguish between instances where 
respondents are unaware of recorded information and cases where 
information was not recorded a t  a l l .  E a c h  c a t e g o r y  o f  i n d i c a t o r s  w a s  t h e n  
scored as a percentage and the overall score was computed as the simple 
average of the percentages across all categories. The overall score therefore 
assigns equal weight to each of the categories in the scorecard. For the 
outcomes category, scores were taken from the overall score computed in 
Table 4 (see section 3.2.2.3) so no norms are suggested in Table 3 for these 
indicators.  
 
Monitoring of these indicators must occur over time to assess the reasons for 
good or poor project performance and to modify norms. The overall scores for 
empowerment and participation ranged from 51.4 to 80.5 per cent at the study 
projects. A score of at least 50 per cent is recommended on the basis that at 
least half of the indicators are present. The following sections discuss the 
indicators tested as measures of empowerment, outreach, trust and 




Table 3:  Scorecard to measure empowerment and participation at seven equity-
share schemes, Western Cape 2004 
Project  number  Indicators Norm 
1  2  3  4 5 6 7 
Control  &  ownership  (%)    22 9 13  28 41 37 50 
Relative worker-shareholding 
(%) 
 10  3.5  6  5  49  40  50 
Workers on the Board of the 
operating entity (%) 
  33  14  20  50 33 33 50 
Skills transfer (%)    100  100  75 50 100  100 75 
Initial training through 
facilitation 
Yes 1  1  1  1 1 1 1 
Ongoing training   Yearly  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Certification  of  courses  Yes 1  1  1  1 1 1 1 
All shareholders receive training  Yes  1  1  0  0  1  1  0 
Understanding (%)    50 100  100 50  100 100 100 
Does the chair of the Trust 
understand the scheme 
Yes 0  1  1  0 1 1 1 
Proportion of worker-
respondents who understand 
scheme (%) 
≥40 = 1  50 75 80 40  80  75 100 
Information (%)    67 67 67 33 100  100  100 
Frequency of general meetings  Yearly  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Worker attendance at last 
general meeting (%) 
≥80 = 1  DK1  DK DK  N/A2  80 100 90 
Circulation of minutes  Yes  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Outcomes (%) See Table 4    55  76  54  41 73 62 69 
Tenure security (%)    0 0 0 0  100  33  33 
Worker income (%)    80  100  50  25 25 50 50 
Housing quality (%)    67  100  100  100  100  67  100 
Basic services (%)    80  80  60  60  40  80  80 
Working conditions (%)    80  100  60  20  100  80  80 
Outreach (%)    67  66  59  69 59 44 63 
Relative female shareholding (%)    50  59  36  56  54  33  39 
Female Trustees (%)    50  40  40  50  22  DK  50 
Shareholding of unskilled 
workers relative to their share of 
enterprise workforce (%) 
  100  100  100  100 100 100 100 
Trust (%)    100 100 100  80  100  100  100 
Absenteeism rate (%)  ≤10 = 1  <5  <5  10  DK  5-7  5  10 
Wage demands or strikes  None  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Trust in management  ≥3 = 1  4.253  3.75  4.3 4.4 3.56 3.5 3.67 
Worker-management relations  ≥3 = 1  4.03  4.1 4.4 4.6  3.0 3.75 5.0 
Procedures to resolve conflict  Yes  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Participation rate (%)    82  82  61  61 71 69 82 
Overall score (%)  50  68  75  66  51 81 77 80 
Notes: 
1DK = Do not know. 
2N/A = Not applicable. 




3.2.2.1 Control and ownership 
 
Ownership is measured by relative worker-shareholding, and control by 
worker representation at Board level. There is a positive correlation between 
worker-shareholding and Board representation in the study schemes. The 
ability of workers to influence decision-making is also indicated by skills 
transfer and information, as discussed in section 3.2.2.2.  
 
Various sectors of South African business have recently proposed BEE charters 
dealing with control and ownership issues. The goals proposed by these 
charters may be subjective but indicate what is practically desirable when 
assessing worker-shareholding at equity-share schemes. The Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, recently outlined a framework 
for BEE in agriculture in the form of the draft Agri BEE charter. In terms of this 
draft, targets have been proposed for farmworkers to achieve a ten per cent 
ownership stake in all farm enterprises by 2008; black representation at 
executive level of 30 per cent by 2006; and the elimination of illiteracy amongst 
farmworkers by 2010 (Paton, 2004:25). Some of the study schemes exceed the 
requirements proposed by Agri BEE for black ownership, Board 
representation and literacy training. Three of the seven projects have a relative 
worker-shareholding above ten per cent; five have more than 30 per cent black 
representation at executive level (directors that are previously disadvantaged 
worker-shareholders); and four have provided some form of literacy training. 
In addition, five have ongoing training programmes to equip workers in 
subjects such as banking skills, interpretation of financial statements, life skills 
and farm management.  
 
More than half of the study schemes do not meet the target proposed by Agri 
BEE for worker-shareholding. Given the modest size of LRAD grants, Agri 
BEE’s proposed target of ten per cent may simply not be attainable at schemes 
that have substantial equity capital or a small workforce. The targets proposed 
by Agri BEE are therefore questionable and are not applied as norms for 
equity-share schemes in this study. In general, the ability of workers to 
participate in and influence decisions was highest at those schemes with a 
worker-shareholding of ten per cent or more. However, project 2 had the 
lowest worker-shareholding (3.5 per cent) but scored 75 per cent for 
empowerment and participation (Table 3) compared to the other six schemes 
where worker equity ranged from five to 50 per cent. 
 
The proportion of worker-directors on the Board of the operating entity was 
above 33 per cent at five of the seven schemes, and 14 and 20 per cent at the 




representation was the lowest (3.5 and 14 per cent respectively), scores 
computed for measures of worker satisfaction and participation, outcomes and 
understanding were consistently the highest indicating that the majority 
shareholders were willing to include and empower worker-shareholders 
despite their small shareholding. These worker-shareholders also felt that they 
could influence working conditions if they wanted to, trusted management 
and rated their participation in decision-making as good. While there is clearly 
room for improvement in the shareholding of workers at this project it has 
performed very well in many other aspects of empowerment. This unexpected 
outcome may partially be explained by the fact that worker-shareholders had 
applied for LRAD grants to finance additional equity in the scheme. 
 
By contrast, project 4 had one of the two highest scores for Board 
representation (50 per cent) but relatively low scores for skills transfer, 
understanding, information, outcomes and trust. This is the only project that 
fits Karaan’s (2003) view t h a t  w o r k e r s  m a y  b e  u n a b l e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p o l i c y  
decisions even if they are well represented on the Board of directors. 
Nevertheless, exceptions like projects 2 and 4 suggest that the relative 
shareholding of workers by itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
indicator of empowerment and participation. 
 
3.2.2.2 Skills transfer, understanding and information 
 
Respondents were given a list of skills training courses and were asked when 
last training occurred (if at all) and to rate the quality of training. The quality 
of training was measured using workers’ understanding of the scheme and 
certification of courses. Data were also gathered on whether worker-
shareholders had received initial training through the facilitation process. 
Understanding of the scheme was objectively tested by asking respondents to 
sketch or explain the ownership structure of the equity-share scheme 
indicating the groups of the shareholders and their relative shareholding. 
Access to information was measured by the frequency of general meetings, 
circulation of minutes and attendance at meetings. The scores awarded to the 
study projects for indicators of skills transfer, understanding and information 
highlight some of the positive relationships anticipated between these 
concepts. At project 4 where there was no ongoing training, most worker-
shareholders (including the chair of the Trust) could not describe the 
ownership structure and no general meetings had been held. This is in 
contrast with project 6 where there is ongoing training, regular meetings are 
held and the vast majority of worker-shareholders understand the scheme’s 




occurs at least once a year. This was the average frequency of training at the 




Outcomes of the equity-sharing arrangement were measured by asking 
respondents to identify what benefits they had received before and after the 
scheme had been established. Respondents were also asked to rate the 
importance of each benefit. Unfortunately, the majority of workers rated every 
benefit as very important. In future surveys, respondents should rather be 
asked to rank the relative importance of say the five most important benefits. 
The outcomes of equity-share schemes were grouped into five categories 
measuring tenure security, worker income, housing quality, basic services and 
working conditions (Table 4). 
 
Table 4:  Scores for the outcomes at seven equity-share schemes, Western Cape 
2004 
Project number  Outcome 
1 2 3 4 5  6  7 
Tenure  security  (%)  0 0 0 0  100  33  33 
Residential  plots  0 0 0 0 1  0  0 
Property  ownership  0 0 0 0 1  1  1 
Long-term  leases  0 0 0 0 1  0  0 
Working  conditions  (%)  80 100 60  20 100  80  80 
Influence  wages  1 1 0 0 1  1  1 
Influence  working  conditions  1 1 1 0 1  1  1 
Secure  employment  1 1 1 1 1  1  1 
Medical  contributions  0 1 1 0 1  1  0 
Pension  benefits  1 1 0 0 1  0  1 
Basic services (%)  80  80  60  60  40  80  80 
Access to electricity  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Health  services  1 1 1 1 1  1  1 
Schools  0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Improved  roads  1 1 0 0 0  1  1 
Access to telephones  1  1  1  1  0  1  1 
Worker  income  (%)  50 100 50  25  25  50  50 
Dividend  income  0 1 0 0 0  0  1 
Capital gains on shares  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Interest received from loans1  1 1 1 1 1  1  1 
Wage  increase  0 1 1 0 0  1  0 
Housing  quality  (%)  67  100 100 100 100  67  100 
Improved  housing  0 1 1 1 1  0  1 
Improved  sanitation  1 1 1 1 1  1  1 
Access to safe drinking water  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Overall  score  (%)  55 76 54 41 73  62  69 




Variables within each of these categories were coded as dummy variables 
(with one indicating the presence of an attribute, and zero otherwise) and then 
summed to yield a percentage of the maximum possible score. This percentage 
score contributes to the overall empowerment scores presented in Table 3. 
 
The (unweighted) outcome scores for the study schemes ranged from 41 to 76 
per cent. All but one of these schemes scored low for tenure security because 
worker-shareholders did not acquire residential plots or long-term leases. 
Project 4 scored lowest on outcomes. Considering the poor performance of this 
project on other indicators it would seem prudent to suggest a target for 





The proportion of female Trustees was chosen as a meaningful and objective 
measure of female representation rather than female representation on the 
Board of directors because there are seldom more than one or two worker 
representatives on the Board. The relative shareholding of women in the 
worker’s Trust was above the target set by the Financial Sector Charter 
(Banking Council of SA, 2004) (11 per cent) at all seven schemes. Female 
shareholding in the worker’s Trust ranged from 33-59 per cent, and their 
representation as Trustees from 22-54 per cent with five of the seven schemes 
recording levels in excess of 40 per cent. Female representation in the workers’ 
Trust is proportional, or more than proportional, to female shareholding in the 
majority of study schemes and significantly higher than levels of female 
representation in the wine industry as a whole. Kassier et al (2004) reported 
that only about one per cent of Board representatives in corporate wine 
businesses in South Africa are women. A target of 30 per cent female 
representation in the workers’ Trust seems reasonable, but may not apply to 
agricultural industries characterised by heavy manual work. In these cases 
female shareholding should at least be proportional to their representation in 
the workforce of the enterprise. 
 
Likewise, the proportion of unskilled worker-shareholders should be at least 
proportional to their representation in the total workforce. Two schemes did 
not employ unskilled workers on a permanent basis and therefore excluded 
unskilled workers as shareholders. At the remaining five schemes, the 
shareholding of unskilled workers was proportional to their share of the 
workforce in the enterprise. All of the unskilled permanent workers owned 




unskilled males. Unskilled workers, male and female, were paid at the 




Five of the seven study projects indicated that worker absenteeism was at or 
below five per cent. At one project the absenteeism rate was ten per cent and 
at the remaining project the manager did not know what the rate was. In view 
of these observations it is recommended that the norm for absenteeism should 
be less than ten per cent. There had been no wage demands at five of the seven 
projects and at the remaining two projects wage demands were settled 
through a process of negotiation. At project 6, wage disputes were settled by 
introducing a system where workers determined standards including an 
acceptable level of absenteeism and completion of skills training courses to 
qualify for a wage increase. Formal procedures to resolve disputes were in 
place at all of the projects. Worker respondents rated participation in these 
procedures as very important but less than 50 per cent participated in their 
design. This suggests that although workers have procedures for resolving 
conflict, their ideas on how conflict should be resolved were not taken into 
account. 
 
Respondents were also asked to rate their trust in management and worker-
management relations on a scale of one to five, where one was very poor and 
five was excellent. This provided a more subjective indicator of worker 
confidence. Mean scores for trust in management ranged from 3.5 to 4.4, which 
implies that trust in management is above average to high. Scores for worker-
management relations ranged from average to excellent. Considering the 
distribution of these scores it is appropriate to assume that schemes that score 
below average for these two indicators are below the norm and have low 
worker confidence. Disinvestment was not used in the scorecard (Table 3) as a 
five-year moratorium had been imposed on the sale of shares by worker-
shareholders at all of the study schemes. In future studies, when moratoria are 
no longer applicable, it may be useful to include this indicator as a measure of 
worker confidence in the scheme. 
 
3.2.2.6 Participation rate 
 
Ndibi and Kay’s (1999) method of measuring participation was applied by 
asking worker respondents to rate the importance of five activities and the 
levels of worker participation in those activities. Respondents were asked 
about the importance of, and levels of worker participation in; deciding on 




workshopping the plans and procedures to create and run the equity-share 
scheme; establishing a formal organisation and institutions to represent 
workers’ interests; and female representation in the scheme. The importance of 
each activity was rated from one to five, where five was the most important. 
For participation, respondents were given a series of statements ranging from 
no participation at all to 100 per cent participation and were asked to choose 
the statement that best matched their opinion. These statements were then 
used to classify participation into quintiles ranging from very high (βi = 100 
per cent) to none at all (βi = 0 per cent). Weighted participation rates were then 
summed across activities to estimate an overall participation rate for each 
study project. 
 
The participation rates presented in Table 3 ranged from 60.5 to 82.4 per cent, 
with the majority achieving levels above 69 per cent. For the activities selected, 
a minimum participation target of 70 per cent seems reasonable when 
compared to the empowerment indicators in Table 3. Considering the inherent 
subjectivity in estimated participation rates, other more objective indicators of 
participation might be considered; for example, worker attendance at general 
meetings and voluntary training courses, the proportion of workers who are 
not shareholders and outcomes realised.   
 
3.2.3   Institutional arrangements and governance 
 
Table 5 presents the institutional arrangements and governance indicators 
used to score the operating entity at each study scheme. The indicators 
highlighted in italics were considered to be less important by Ithala 
Development Finance Corporation (Pringle, 2004) when assessing loan 
applications. Each indicator was scored as a dummy variable where one 
indicated the presence of an attribute and zero otherwise. These scores were 
then summed and expressed as a percentage of the maximum score possible 
for each category. The (unweighted) overall score was computed as the 
average percentage across all three categories.  
 
The overall scores at the Western Cape study schemes ranged from 40 to 92 
per cent, with most schemes (six) scoring above 69 per cent. Project 4 scored 
consistently low across empowerment and institutional arrangements, 
especially those that seek to ensure transparency. These included general 
meetings, disclosure of audited statements, notice and conduct of meetings, 
and obligations for directors to declare their shareholdings and transactions 
with the business. Preliminary findings suggest a positive link between 
transparency and levels of worker understanding and information (Table 3) as 




relationship. Project 4 scores poorly on all three of these indicators whereas the 
opposite is true of Project 6. 
 
Table  5:  Scorecard for institutional arrangements and governance at seven 
equity-share schemes, Western Cape 2004 
Project number 
Indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Accountability (%) 















Directors  aware  of  collective  liability  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Penalties for management  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Incentive scheme for managers  1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Incentive scheme for workers  1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Transparency (%) 















Disclosure  of  financial  statements  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Directors declare shareholding & personal transactions  0  0  1  0  1  1  1 
Board approval for pledging land as collateral  0  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Formal  procedures  for  conflict  resolution  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notice  of  meetings  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Circulation  of  minutes  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Property rights (%) 















Nomination of directors in proportion to shareholding  1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Non-shareholders  cannot  vote  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shares cannot be bequeathed to multiple heirs  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Shares cannot be bequeathed to non-shareholders  0  1  1  1  0  0  0 
Shares cannot be bequeathed to outsiders  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Tradable benefit rights in proportion to shareholding 
(operating entity) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tradable voting rights in proportion to shareholding 
(operating entity) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tradable benefit & voting rights in proportion to 
shareholding (workers’ Trust)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Restrictions on sale of shares to outsiders  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Temporary moratorium on sale of shares by original owner  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Shareholders must sell shares if they leave employment  0  1  0  1  1  1  1 
Overall  score  (%)  73 80 76 40 72 92 69 
 
Schemes that scored 69 per cent and above on the institutional and governance 
scorecard are all characterised by the presence of external audits, annual 
general meetings, disclosure of financial statements, formal procedures for 
conflict resolution, and tradable benefit and voting rights in proportion to 
individual investment in both the operating entity and workers’ Trust. These 
attributes might be considered as fundamental requirements for the operating 






Gray et al (2004) proposed four criteria to monitor the performance of equity-
share schemes as instruments of agrarian reform and BEE in South African 
agriculture: poverty alleviation; empowerment and participation; institutional 
arrangements and governance; and financial health. This paper focuses on the 
non-financial criteria. Empirical analysis of data gathered in 2004 from a land 
reform project in the Midlands of KwaZulu-Natal and seven established 
equity-share schemes in the Western Cape were used to identify an objective 
set of indicators for these criteria.  
 
A transition matrix was used to measure changes in the income, wealth, health 
and housing quality profile of beneficiary households at the land reform 
p r o j e c t .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  c h a n g e s  i n  a b s o l u t e  o r  r e l a t i v e  p o v e r t y  a t  
Clipstone, conclusions regarding the performance of the CPA should not be 
drawn from this paper. The aim of using data from Clipstone was merely to 
demonstrate the application of the transition matrix as a suitable method for 
measuring poverty. This method is recommended over single dimensional 
poverty lines and does not rely on an assumed relationship between current 
income and assets. Importantly, it generates information about changes in 
both relative and absolute levels of (multi-dimensional) poverty over time, 
and these changes can be tested for statistical significance. 
 
A scorecard approach is recommended for empowerment and participation, 
based on eight categories of indicators: control and ownership; skills transfer; 
understanding; information; outcomes; trust; outreach and participation. 
Empirical evidence was used to suggest norms for each indicator. The overall 
scores for empowerment and participation ranged from 51.4 to 80.5 per cent at 
the study projects. A score of at least 50 per cent is recommended on the basis 
that at least half of the indicators are present. A scorecard approach is also 
recommended for institutional arrangements and governance. Three 
categories of indicators are recommended: accountability, transparency and 
property rights. The indicators show the presence or absence of attributes that 
alleviate the problems of free- and forced-riding. These problems tend to 
undermine the performance of conventional co-operatives. The overall scores 
at the study schemes ranged from 40 to 92 per cent, with most schemes scoring 
above 69 per cent. Schemes that scored above 69 per cent are all characterised 
by the presence of external audits, annual general meetings, disclosure of 
financial statements, formal procedures for conflict resolution, and tradable 
benefit and voting rights assigned in proportion to individual investment. 




overall scores are computed to provide comparisons between schemes and 
over time. 
 
The scorecards proposed in this paper are recommended as an alternative to 
the Department of Land Affairs’ (DLA) monitoring and evaluation approach, 
which relies on “quality of life surveys”. Such surveys measure outcomes that 
may not be related to the project or its performance. The performance 
indicators recommended in this paper are objective. They are relevant, 
manageable in number, and have feasible norms rooted in empirical evidence. 
The robustness of these indicators and their norms needs to be tested on a 
wider scale and monitored over time. Further research is also needed to 
determine the contribution of each indicator to overall performance in order to 
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